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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, 
a Texas corporation, 
Plainti ff-Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
GAIL C. POTTER AND LORI 
POTTER, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
plaintiff-appellant and cross-respondent "plaintiff" The 
Southland Corporation submits its Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues (as they relate to plaintiff's 
appeal) are presented for review. 
• 1. Did the evidence establish that there were 
agreements between the parties1 predecessor in title and 
plaintiff which ran with the land so as to bind defendants 
and give plaintiff the right of ingress and egress over the 
property in question and did the trial court err in holding 
otherwise? 
2. Did the evidence establish that plaintiff has an 
implied easement over the property in question and did the 
trial court err in holding otherwise? 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 860413 
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3* Are the trial court's Findings of Fact supported by 
the evidence and are its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law sufficient to support its judgment? 
NATURE OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an action where plaintiff seeks a determination 
that it has certain rights of ingress and egress over 
property between its 7-Eleven store property and Dixie Drive 
in West Jordan City, Utah. Plaintiff contends that there 
were agreements with a common predecessor in title affording 
such right of ingress and egress and that such agreements 
ran with the land so as to bind defendants. It further 
contends that the agreements and circumstances under which 
the property was acquired from the common predecessor 
created an implied easement over such property. 
On January 8, 1986, defendants caused a barrier 
(consisting of cables strung between steel poles) to be 
erected along the eastern boundary of the property in 
question and the western boundary of plaintiff's property. 
During the preceding eighteen months after defendants 
purchased the property, there had been no other attempts to 
preclude the use of the property by plaintiff's customers 
and suppliers. 
Following the erection of the barrier, this action was 
brought and a hearing on plaintiff's request for preliminary 
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injunction was held on January 20, 1986. During the hearing 
it was agreed by the parties that a preliminary injunction 
could issue for a period of sixty days, at which time a 
trial on the merits would he held. Following the trial held 
on April 11, 1986, the trial court took the matter under 
advisement. On May 23, 1986, it issued a memorandum 
decision holding that plaintiff had no rights in the 
property and dismissing defendants1 counterclaim seeking 
damages for use of the property on the basis that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that defendants had 
sustained such damages. The judgment was entered on June 
23, 1986. Thereafter, defendants erected a fence completely 
around the property in question, limiting access to the 
7-Eleven store to one curbcut on the side of the store, 
resulting in a substantial loss of business to plaintiff. 
At the trial, defendants1 attorney had in fact stipulated 
and the trial court had taken judicial notice of the fact 
that there would be an economic impact upon plaintiff if the 
property in question could not be driven across (R. 183) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Texas corporation qualified to do 
business in Utah and is operating 7-Eleven convenience food 
stores therein and elsewhere (R. 2, R. 44). Defendants are 
land developers who are residents of California (R. 214-15). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In the 1970 's the parties1 common predecessor in title, 
Big Six Corporation, and an affiliate, Dixie Six Corpora-
tion, developed a large residential area in West Jordan, 
Utah, known as "Dixie Valley." They set aside six acres of 
land located at 6200 South and Dixie Drive (3255 West) to be 
developed as a shopping center to serve the residential area 
(R. 199). Big Six was the affiliate designated to develop 
the shopping center (R. 199). Big Six is the common 
predecessor in title of plaintiff and defendants (R. 90, R. 
156, R. 165, R. 239; Exs. 10, 12). 
In April 1975 plaintiff entered into an agreement (R. 
159; Ex. 1) with Big Six Corporation to purchase a parcel of 
the shopping center for the construction of a 7-Eleven 
store. The agreement was specifically subject to the 
purchased property being properly rezoned and plaintiff 
being able to obtain permits and licenses for such store (R. 
162; Ex. 1). It indicated that there would be "open access" 
between the 7-Eleven store property and the shopping center. 
At that time, none of the property set aside for the 
shopping center was zoned for commercial purposes. Such 
store could not be constructed thereon nor could the 
shopping center be developed with such zoning (R. 171. R. 
200; Exs. 6,7). 
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Under the terms of the original agreement (Ex. 1), the 
7-Eleven store was to have faced north, fronting on 6200 
South, and the survey for the shopping center (Ex, 9) 
performed for Big Six so indicated (R. 161). At that time, 
it was contemplated that the West Valley Expressway (still 
under consideration) would run north and south directly to 
the east of the proposed shopping center and that there 
would be access to the expressway off 6200 South, directly 
east of the property being purchased for the 7-Eleven store 
(R. 188, R. 200). For that reason and upon the recommenda-
tion of its city planner, West Jordan City refused to rezone 
the property to allow the construction of either the 
7-Eleven store or the shopping center as a whole (R. 166; 
Exs. 6, 7). During the attempts to obtain rezoning, 
representatives of Big Six appeared before the West Jordan 
Planning Commission to present plans for the 7-Eleven store 
and at that time they were told that in order to obtain 
approval, the store would have to be faced west rather than 
north as originally proposed (R. 186-8; Exs. 6, 7). • 
In December 1975 the West Jordan City Council met after 
being assured by both Mr. Bowles, an officer of Big Six, and 
the surveyor for Big Six Corporation that the 7-Eleven store 
would be turned so that access was off Dixie Drive rather 
than 6200 South and the council then agreed to the rezoning 
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(Ex. 6). In April 1976, following such rezoning, Mr. Bowles 
appeared before the Planning Commission to obtain a building 
permit for the 7-Eleven store (R. 205; Ex. 6). At that 
time, the site plan still showed the 7-Eleven store fronting 
on 6200 South. The Planning Commission approved the 
building permit only on the conditions that the store be 
faced west with access off Dixie Drive and that proper 
assurances to that effect first be received by the city 
planner (R. 191-3; Ex. 6). 
Several days later, Mr. Bowles, representing Big Six 
Corporation, and Mr. E. L. Pack, Zone Manager for plaintiff, 
signed a short letter agreement (Ex. 3), written on West 
Jordan City letterhead, which was intended to give such 
assurances (R. 173, R. 191-6, R. 202-3). The agreement 
provided, in effect, that (1) if the 7-Eleven store was 
faced west, the city would allow access from 6200 South 
until construction of the West Valley Expressway, at which 
time it might have to be closed; (2) there would have to be 
two rights-of-way in from Dixie Drive from the store; and 
(3) all property between Dixie Drive and the store would 
have to be blacktopped and landscaped at 7-Elevenfs expense 
(Ex. 3). Mr. Bowles testified that Big Six was agreeing 
thereby to provide access off Dixie Drive to handle the 
traffic load. Mr. Bowles also testified (R. 201-2) : 
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Q. Okay, in any event, in connection with an 
issuance of a building permit for 7-Eleven stores, 
the city was requiring access onto Dixie Drive 
which is 3655 West? 
A. I don't know what they are (sic) 
requiring for 7-Eleven. I do know that in our 
scheme we were prepared to put ingress and egress 
on Dixie Drive to satisfy our needs. When I say 
"our", I am referred to Big Six Corporation's 
needs. 
Q. In fact, the city—you previously 
testified that the city wanted egress and ingress 
off of Dixie Drive? 
A. They did. 
Q. That you previously have testified that 
you were willing to give at that time the 7-Eleven 
store egress and ingress off Dixie Drive in 
response to that and stated "We had to have it for 
our own development." Is that your answer to that 
question at that time? 
A. That is correct. 
Before Mr. Bowles appearances at the Planning Commis-
sion, but after the City Council meeting (Ex. 6), the 
original purchase agreement (Ex. 1) had, in fact, been 
amended to change the dimensions so that the 7-Eleven store 
was reoriented to front on Dixie Drive (R. 171, R. 201). 
The amended purchase agreement (Ex. 2) changed the legal 
description to turn the property to face Dixie Drive, thus 
running longitudinally east and west rather than north and 
south (Exs. 1, 2, 11). The amended agreement also contained 
a plot plan, signed by the then president of Big Six (now 
deceased) (R. 201), which specifically provided that the 
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property in question would be "open parking" and that 
immediately to the south thereof would be a "fifty-foot 
service road" (Ex. ?) . 
The 7-Eleven store was completed, as shown on the 
amended agreement (Ex. 2) , in September 1976 and the 
improvements installed around that time (R. 135; Ex. 4). 
The improvements were constructed at the expense of 
plaintiff and with the concurrence of Big Six. They 
consisted of blacktopping to Dixie Drive, installation of 
curb and gutter and landscaping along 6200 South to Dixie 
Drive. These improvements have remained in place basically 
as originally constructed (Ex. 8). 
In November 1976, because of the need for additional 
width resulting from the store's reorientation, plaintiff 
entered into an agreement with Dixie Six (to whom the 
property had been conveyed by Big Six) (R. 181) to purchase 
an additional twenty feet along the southern boundary of its 
property. At the time these parcels were purchased by 
plaintiff, the parties contemplated that the property in 
question would be open for mutual use by 7-Eleven and the 
other occupants of the shopping center and that nothing was 
to be constructed thereon except a sign designating the 
shopping center to be located at the corner of 62 00 South 
and Dixie Drive (R. 176-7; Exs. 1, 2). When the 7-Eleven 
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store was constructed, the property purchased by plaintiff, 
as well as the property in question, was not only black-
topped and landscaped, but was raised several feet above the 
surrounding property (R. 204). It had been used by 
plaintiff's customers and suppliers since that time for 
ingress and egress to the 7-Eleven store until defendants 
constructed a fence around the property in question 
following the trial court's judgment herein (R. 102-3). 
The shopping center was not developed as planned by Big 
Six Corporation (Ex. 8). In fact, except for the 7-Eleven 
store, the property stood vacant until it was purchased in 
June 1984 by defendants (R. 217). At the time of defen-
dants' purchase, they noticed that the property in question 
appeared to be part of the 7-Eleven property, although title 
was in Big Six (R. 208, R. 239). They noticed that it was 
being used by the store's customers and were curious as to 
whether 7-Eleven had any rights to the property. They 
questioned the real estate agent who handled the matter and 
were assured that there were no "recorded" rights. Although 
there is a dispute as to when the conversation took place, 
plaintiff's representative testified in effect that whether 
they recorded it or not, they claimed an interest in the 
property and would be willing to fight over it (R. 231). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The property which was to have been developed by Big 
Six as a shopping center was purchased by defendants and 
conveyed to them on June 4, 1984, by warranty deed (Ex. 10) 
which was subject not only to easements, covenants and 
conditions of existing record, but those "enforceable in law 
or in equity." Defendants have since constructed a portion 
of a shopping center on the south end of the property, but 
not on the north end where the 7-Eleven store is located (R. 
215) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff and defendants1 common predecessor in title, 
Big Six Corporation, entered into agreements with plaintiff 
to allow it access over property in front of the 7-Eleven 
store constructed by it. The 7-Eleven store was to be part 
of a shopping center which was to have been constructed by 
Big Six. In connection with those agreements, plaintiff had 
agreed to reorient its store so that the entire property 
could be rezoned and the property in question was to be open 
for use by all occupants of the shopping center. Without 
use of the property in question, plaintiff has no frontage 
for its 7-Eleven store, but only a small curbcut on the side 
of its property, which is not sufficient to allow the 
operation of such store economically. 
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These agreements touch and concern the properties and 
hence ran with the land so as to bind defendants. At the 
time defendants purchased the property from Big Six, it had 
been utilized by plaintiff's customers and suppliers for a 
period of approximately nine years. The occupancy of the 
property in question by plaintiff was evident. Thus, 
defendants had notice of plaintiff's rights at the time they 
purchased the property, but they did not make adequate, if 
any, inquiry regarding those rights. 
The circumstances created an implied easement in favor 
of plaintiff over the property in question and all condi-
tions required by law for the acquisition of such easement 
had been met. Finally, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were totally inadequate. Indeed, there was no 
finding on any of the material issues. The conclusions, 
which purport to be findings, were not supported by the 
evidence and even if they were, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law did not support the judgment entered 
herein. 
POINT I 
The evidence before the trial court clearly established 
that the parties' common predecessor in interest entered 
into agreements with plaintiff to allow it access over the 
property in question from Dixie Drive to its 7-Eleven store 
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and that such agreements ran with the land so as to bind 
defendants. The trial court erred in not considering all of 
the circumstances behind such agreements and holding that 
the agreements were not sufficient for such purpose. 
There were three written documents received into 
evidence herein which, when considered with all of the 
negotiations and circumstances leading up to their execu-
tion, clearly establish that Big Six Corporation would 
furnish access consisting of two rights-of-way across the 
property in question for ingress and egress to the 7-Eleven 
store. The first two were the agreement of sale and the 
amendment thereto. The original agreement clearly provided 
that there would be "open access" between the shopping 
center in question and the 7-Eleven store property. The 
amendment provided that such property was to be "open 
parking." These two writings substantiate plaintiff1s 
contentions and testimony that the property was to remain 
open for common use by all occupants of the shopping center, 
including ingress and egress to the 7-Eleven store. 
Of even stronger import was an express written 
agreement (Ex. 3) between Big Six, the parties1 predecessor 
in title, and plaintiff to allow such access. Admittedly, 
that agreement could have been expressed in clearer and more 
detailed language. Nonetheless, v/hen the circumstances 
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under which it was written and all other factors are taken 
into consideration, the intended purpose and effect of such 
agreement is not difficult to comprehend. Moreover, there 
is not, as defendants1 attorney has suggested, any need to 
modify or contradict a written agreement and thus violate 
the parole evidence rule. First, there is nothing contra-
dictory. Second, it has long been established that when a 
writing is ambiguous, obscure in its terms or incomplete 
that parole or extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show 
what was in the minds of the parties at the time of making 
the agreement in order to determine the objective thereof. 
It is particularly clear that evidence of surrounding 
circumstances or previous negotiations, dealings or events 
may be received for such purpose. A case to such effect is 
Winegar v. Smith Invest. Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah 1979). 
Other pertinent cases are University Club v. Invesco Holding 
Corp., 504 P.2d 29 (Utah 1972); The Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957). The rule 
is well stated in Restatement of Contracts 2d, § 210 
(Comment b, p. 118), as follows: 
That a writing was or was not adopted as a 
completely integrated agreement may be proved by 
any relevant evidence. A document in the form of 
a written contract, signed by both parties and 
apparently complete on its face may be decisive of 
the issue in the absence of credible contrary 
evidence. But a writing cannot of itself prove 
its own completeness and wide latitude must be 
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allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on 
the intention of the parties. 
It cannot be disputed that there were written agree-
ments between plaintiff and Big Six regarding the parcel in 
question. Mr. Bowles, who signed the letter agreement, 
acknowledged that he did so as an officer of Big Six and 
that its purpose was to afford access to the 7-Eleven store 
from Dixie Drive (R. 201-3) . The evidence is also clear 
that he did so for the mutual benefit of both plaintiff and 
Big Six, which was interested in obtaining working capital 
because "they needed the dollars." And they could not 
otherwise comply with the agreement of sale and get their 
shopping center zoned for commercial purposes. Both parties 
recognized that the small side entrance on 6200 South was 
subject to being closed off at any time; and, thus, access 
to the 7-Eleven store would have to be off Dixie Drive, upon 
which the 7-Eleven store was then to front. Thus, this 
change was done more to accommodate Big Six than plaintiff 
and was in connection with the general plan of development 
for its proposed shopping center. 
Considering these extrinsic factors, one could not 
reasonably and fairly contend that there were not agreements 
between Big Six and plaintiff providing for access across 
the property in question. The only question is whether such 
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agreements "ran with the land" so as to bind defendants. 
Plaintiff submits that they do. 
In order for a burden or a promise respecting use of 
land to run with the land so as to bind successors in title 
of a promisor, four requirements must be met. (1) The 
promise must be in writing; (2) the parties must have 
intended that the promise run with the land; (3) the promise 
must "touch and concern" the land; and (4) there must be 
privity between the promisee (plaintiff) and the promisor 
(Big Six) and between the promisor (Big Six) and the person 
sought to be bound (defendants). These requirements are set 
forth in Restatement of Property, §§ 530-538 (1944). 
All four requirements have been plainly satisfied in 
the present case. First, the agreements were evidenced by 
at least two writings; second, the circumstances indicated 
that the parties intended that the agreements run with the 
land. In such regard, this court has unequivocally 
established that circumstances surrounding execution of the 
covenant may indicated the necessary intention. Thus, in 
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 373 P.2d 
940 (1962), it found the necessary intention primarily 
because the purpose of the covenant was to benefit the 
promisee's permanent business interests. It held that the 
circumstances of a transaction may prove the intention that 
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the agreement run with the land despite the absence of a 
specific term binding the parties' successors. 
Here, the circumstances weigh even more heavily in 
favor of such finding. Without the guaranteed means of 
ingress and egress, particularly when its access on 6200 
South could have been closed off by West Jordan City, the 
plaintiff's land would have been entirely valueless. That 
circumstance negates any argument that the arrangement was 
not to be a permanent one. Moreover, there is really no 
doubt that the 7-Eleven store was to have been a part of the 
proposed shopping center. It was in fact the first 
occupant. Thus, Restatement of Property, § 531, p. 3198 
(1944), is particularly pertinent: 
If the promise was procured by the promisee 
in a pursuit of a general plan of development 
which includes not only the land with respect to 
which the promise was made, but other land as 
well, the likelihood that the promise was expected 
to be binding upon the successors of the promisor 
is great, as it would in all probability seriously 
interfere with a successful carrying out of the 
plan if this were net true. A general plan 
implies a controlled stability of use and 
appearance. This fact is one of the chief 
inducements to purchase under the plan. Such 
stability is within the normal expectations of the 
parties. . . . It would not exist unless the 
promises respecting use made by the parties to the 
conveyances under the plan bound not only the 
respective promisors but their successors as well. 
(Emphasis added.) 
That section also notes that expression of intention 
need not take any particular form. Yet, the permanency of 
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the situation apparently sought to be produced by perfor-
mance of the promise substantially increases the probability 
that such promise was intended to bind the promisor's 
successor. 
Here there is not only written evidence of an intention 
that the promise to afford access runs with the land, but 
also the numerous factors mentioned above strongly establish 
that such intention must be presumed. The only other 
presumption would be that plaintiff was being led down the 
primrose path by Big Six and its officers. 
There can be no argument as to the remaining two 
requirements. The promises made by Big Six relate to the 
physical use of both the 7-Eleven store property and the 
property in question and, thus, "touch and concern" the 
land. See Restatement of Property, § 537 (1944). As to the 
requirement of privity, both plaintiff and defendants 
purchased their property from the same seller; hence, the 
requirements of Restatement of Property, § 534 (1944), that 
the promisor must be in privity with both the promisee and 
promisor's successor in title have been met. 
Indeed, all of the conditions required to establish an 
agreement running with the land are present and readily 
ascertainable in the present case. Plaintiff, as promisee, 
is entitled to enforce the promise against defendants. The 
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inequity of holding otherwise is readily apparent. Except 
for plaintiff's cooperation in amending the agreement of 
sale so the 7-Eleven store would face west rather than 
north, Big Six, would not have been able to have its land 
zoned for a shopping center. Inasmuch as no further 
development had taken place on the property until it was 
purchased by defendants, the property would presumably still 
remain residentially zoned and its value at the time of such 
sale would have been substantially less than it was. 
Plaintiff believes that this court could not readily 
accept an argument that if Big Six still owned the land and 
was ready to begin development of a shopping center, it 
could come to plaintiff and say "Our plans have been 
changed. You will no longer have any frontage for your 
property, but must rely on access only to 6200 South, if 
available." 
Plaintiff further submits that defendants are in no 
better position to deny access than Big Six, the original 
promisor, would be. The promise contained in the agreements 
is one which meets all of the requirements for and does in 
fact run with the land. Defendants are thus bound by those 
agreements. 
There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
dealing with the question of whether an agreement does or 
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does not run with the land. These basically have been 
decided on their individual facts and it would serve no 
useful purpose to restate them here. Most, however, have 
followed the Restatement requirements set forth above. One 
case which discusses the issue of intent and follows the 
holding of this court in Metropolitan Investment Co. v. 
Sine, supra, is Updegrave v. Agee, 484 P.2d 821 (Ore. 1971). 
This case involved an easement over real property. The 
court held that the presence of absence of the phrase 
"successors or assigns" in the agreement is but one element 
to be considered in determining the intention of the 
parties. 
Two other Utah cases are clearly distinguishable. In 
Lundberg v. Dastrup, 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 P.2d 648 (1962), the 
court held that a covenant to pay attorney's fees does not 
run with the land because: 
. . . in order for a covenant to run with the land 
it must be of such character that its performance 
or non-performance will so affect the use, value 
or enjoyment of the land itself that it must be 
regarded as an integral part of the property. 
497 P.2d at 650. 
In First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 2 7 
Utah 2d, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), the court found that a benefit 
did not run with the land because the evidence expressly 
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negated the presence of the requisite intention that it so 
run. 
POINT II 
Under the circumstances of this case, the severance of 
property under the common ownership of the parties1 
predecessor in title created an easement by implication for 
ingress and egress over the property in question and the 
trial court erred in not so holding. 
As do most other jurisdictions, Utah has long recog-
nized that severance of property under common ownership may 
create an easement by implication or "necessity." See, 
e.g., Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948); 
Adamson v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
That principle is treated in Restatement of Property, § 474, 
p. 2972 (1944), et seq., in the following language: 
When land in one ownership is divided into 
separately owned parts by conveyance, an easement 
may be created within the limitations set forth in 
§§ 475 and 476, in favor of one who has or may 
have a possessory interest in one part as against 
one who has or may have a possessory interest in 
another part by implication from the circumstances 
under which the conveyance was made alone. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Restatement then delineates the factors which are 
considered in determining whether an easement by implication 
has been created. Plaintiff believes that all of these 
factors are present here and compel a finding that such an 
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easement was created. Moreover, it is not necessary that 
the person in whose favor the easement was implied has no 
other means of access to his property. Thus, under § 
476(g), p. 2983-4, it is stated: 
. . . If land can be used without an easement, but 
cannot be used without disproportionate effort and 
expense, an easement may still be implied in favor 
of either the conveyor or conveyee on the basis of 
necessity alone without reference to prior use. 
If the necessity of an easement is such that 
without it the land cannot be effectively used, 
nothing less than the explicit language in the 
conveyance negating the creation of the easement 
will prevent its implication. 
That was also the holding by this court, in Adamson v. 
Brockbank, supra. In that case, this court plainly ruled 
that absolute necessity was not required and that such 
principle has "yielded to the rule that the necessity 
requisite to the creation of an easement by implication is 
sufficient if it is a 'reasonable necessity1." The court 
also, relying upon the Restatement of Property, § 467, p. 
2978, noted: 
An easement created by implication arises as 
an inference of the intention of the parties to a 
conveyance of land. The inference is drawn from 
the circumstances under which the conveyance was 
made rather than from the language of the 
conveyance. To draw an inference of intention 
from such circumstances, they must be or must be 
assumed to be within the knowledge of the parties. 
The inference drawn represents an attempt to 
ascribe an intention to parties who had not 
thought or had not bothered to put the intention 
into words or perhaps more often to parties who 
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actually had formed no intention conscious to 
themselves. 
185 P.2d at 270. 
In concluding, the court made the further observation: 
Whether or not the artificial arrangement of 
the material properties of his estate by the 
owner, constituted a technical easement is, under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, 
immaterial. It clearly created a condition to the 
land sold partaking of the character of an 
easement, constituting at least a quasi easement, 
visible to the purchaser, and one of the things in 
the minds of the parties when the bargain of sale 
was made . . . and the vendor could not thereafter 
derogate from his own grant. 
185 P.2d 271. 
In the present case, now that the entire frontage has 
been fenced off, access to the store has become severely 
reduced. The sole access consists of only one curbcut to 
the side, not the front of the store, to service both the 
store itself and the gas islands. This is not sufficient 
for the operation of a convenience food store. As recog-
nized by the trial court and stipulated to by defendants1 
attorney (R. 183), defendants1 actions in denying access 
have had a significant detrimental impact on the operation 
of the 7-Eleven store. Several of the photographic exhibits 
clearly demonstrate this (Ex. 8). Thus, the above language, 
from both the Restatement of Property and Adamson, comes 
into play and this court should recognize that an easement 
by implication was created over the property in question. 
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The failure to record the agreements or notice of 
plaintiff's rights does not prevent it from enforcing them 
against defendants. While the trial court did not get to 
that issue, having determined that the agreements were 
insufficient to give plaintiff any rights to ingress and 
egress over the property in question, it is an issue that 
has consistently been argued by defendants and is therefore 
being briefly addressed herein. 
Defendants have consistently maintained as a principal 
defense that there was no conveyance of an interest in real 
estate within the meaning of § 57-1-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
and that there was nothing placed of record as provided by 
§ 57-3-3, Utah Code Ann., 1953. In answer to these 
contentions, plaintiff has pointed out that the first 
contention entirely begs the question. Plaintiff is not 
contending that there was any actual "conveyance." It does 
maintain, however, that such written conveyance is not 
always necessary to create an interest in or rights over 
some else's land. Otherwise, there would be no reason to 
even talk about agreements running with the land, easements 
by necessity, prescriptive easements or the like. The 
courts have consistently agreed that implementation of these 
doctrines can and does create rights or interests in the 
land without a written conveyance. Moreover, they have long 
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recognized that recording of a conveyance or other instru-
ment is not always necessary to provide notice of any rights 
to a prospective purchaser. 
The basic purpose in recording an instrument is to give 
constructive notice of the matters stated therein. In the 
present case, defendants had actual notice, which is not 
only notice in fact received, but also such as a party is 
presumed to have received personally because the evidence 
within his knowledge was sufficient to put him in inquiry. 
S e e
 Salt Lake, Garfield and Western Railway Co. v. Allied 
Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 883 (1955). In order 
to take advantage of the recording act, defendants would 
have to show that they were bona fide purchasers. But, as 
stated in Blodgett v. March, 590 P.2d 289 (Utah 1978): 
A bona fide purchaser is one who takes 
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts 
sufficient to put him on notice of the complain-
ants equity. 
590 P.2d at 303. 
POINT III 
The trial court's purported Findings of Fact are 
neither findings nor are the conclusionary statements 
purported to be findings supported by the evidence and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not sufficient 
to support the trial court's judgment. 
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The pleadings herein clearly raised the issues set 
forth above that plaintiff was in possession of the property 
in question at the time it was purchased by defendant; that 
there were agreements running with the land to allow 
plaintiff access over said property; that in any event, 
plaintiff had an implied easement across said property. 
Evidence regarding these issues was offered by plaintiff and 
received by the trial court. Yet, there was really no 
Findings of Fact regarding any of these issues. 
This court has had several occasions to rule on the 
adequacy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and had 
consistently held, as it did in Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979), that: 
The importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a 
judge is essential to the resolution of dispute 
under the proper rule of law. To that end, the 
findings should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached. (Citing cases.) 
Unless findings of fact meet such standards, 
application of the proper rule of law is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, and the reviewing 
function of this court is seriously undermined. 
598 P.2d at 1338-9. 
This court has also repeatedly held that failure of a 
trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the 
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judgment be vacated. Thus, in Anderson v. Utah County Board 
of Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), it stated: 
It is true that we indulge the presumption of 
regularity in the proceedings before the trial 
court. But this does not suffice when the record 
itself exposes essential deficiencies. With 
certain exceptions not applicable here, the just 
quoted rule must be complied with and a judgment 
cannot stand unless there are findings which will 
justify it. 
598 P.2d at 1219. 
In LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 
420 P.2d 615 (1966), the court, citing an earlier case, 
declared: 
It is the duty of the trial court to find 
upon materials issues raised by the pleadings, and 
the failure to do so is reversible error. 
420 P.2d at 616. 
See also, Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). v 
Finally, Rule 52, U.R.C.P., requires that Findings of 
Fact be made upon all material issues and Rule 52(b) allows 
failure to make adequate findings to be challenged whether 
or not objection to such findings was made in the district 
court. 
As measured by the above standards and those set forth 
in numerous other cases, the Findings of Fact in the present 
case are woefully inadequate. Findings No. 1, 2 and 3, for 
example, do not relate to any issue over which there was any 
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contest and in no way address the issues to be decided by 
the trial court. While purported Finding No. 4 does to some 
extent address those issues, it is not a finding at all, but 
rather a series of conclusionary statements which merely 
attempt to reinforce the contentions made by defendants. 
That purported finding has in fact been restated almost 
verbatim as Conclusion of Law No. 3. Thus, not only are the 
purported findings inadequate as findings, but the conclu-
sionary statements therein are either immaterial (e.g., 
those holding that there was no recorded document conveying 
any easement or property rights to plaintiff and that there 
v/as no written conveyance or recordable instrument conveying 
any property right thereto) or supported by the evidence 
(e.g., the conclusion that plaintiff's claim of easement is 
without basis). 
As noted above, there was more than adequate evidence 
to support plaintiff's contention that there were agreements 
running with the land to allow plaintiff access across the 
subject property or there v/as an implied easement in favor 
of plaintiff for such access. The first contention—which 
is the principal basis of this action—is not even mentioned 
in the findings. 
Apart from the almost total lack of any proper Findings 
of Fact, neither those findings nor the Conclusions of Law 
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are supported by the evidence. Conclusion No. 1 again was 
not at issue in this case and was in fact admitted by 
plaintiff. Conclusion No. 2 is not supported either by the 
evidence or by any finding. The same is true with Conclu-
sion No. 3 which, as noted above, is merely a reiteration of 
the alleged Finding No. 4. Again, most of it is immaterial. 
Plaintiff admits that defendants' rights in the 
property are superior to those of plaintiff, but this does 
not answer the questions presented as to whether the entire 
property can be blocked off to prohibit access thereover 
which was agreed to by the parties1 common predecessor in 
title. Plaintiff has admitted that there was no recorded 
instrument conveying property rights to it, but under the 
issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, that is 
immaterial. Plaintiff submits that it has, through legally 
recognized means, acquired some rights over the property 
which cannot be completely cut off and taken away by 
defendants. Neither the Findings of Fact nor the Conclu-
sions of Law address this matter. Thus, the judgment 
entered by the trial court is totally unsupportable by the 
evidence or by its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that an affirmance of the trial 
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court's decision herein will result in an extreme injustice 
to it. Contrary to assertions made by defendants that 
plaintiff is trying to get something for nothing—that it 
gave no consideration for the rights of access it claims to 
exist—the record supports the opposite conclusion. In 
reliance upon promises made by Big Six, plaintiff (1) agreed 
to proceed with the purchase and reorient the store and in 
doing so, gave up frontage on an established road with the 
necessary curb cuts; (2) blacktopped the property in 
question and provided curb, gutter and landscaping to Dixie 
Drive (see Ex. 8 photographs); (3) agreed to provide open 
access between the 7-Eleven store property and the shopping 
center. This was done under circumstances where the 
property in question was to remain open for use by all 
occupants thereof. In view of these circumstances and under 
applicable law cited above, the promises were of a character 
which ran with the land and defendants are obligated to 
honor them. 
Defendants argue that the conditions imposed by West 
Jordan City cannot bind them. This, however, is not the 
question. The actions of West Jordan City merely demon-
strate the circumstances under which the letter agreement 
was reached. Moreover, even before that time, the agreement 
of sale and the amendment thereto provided for such access 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and mutual use. It would be entirely inequitable at this 
point to allow Big Six's successor to abrogate those 
agreements and impose a substantial economic loss upon 
plainti ff. 
This court should therefore find that there were 
covenants running with the land, allowing plaintiff access 
from Dixie Drive to its 7-Eleven store or that there was an 
implied easement for such purpose, J 
As to this inadequacy of the purported Findings of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law, little argument is necessary. A 
review thereof, plaintiff submits, will clearly support the 
argument set forth above, both that there really were no 
proper Findings of Fact, that the conclusions, purporting to 
be findings, were not supported by the evidence and that 
neither the Findings of Fact nor the Conclusions of Law 
signed by the trial court support its judgment. 
Plaintiff requests that this court rule that the 
evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants 
are bound by the agreements with the parties1 common 
predecessor in title affording access over the property in 
question from Dixie Drive to the 7-Eleven store; that 
plaintiff is entitled to such access and that it therefore 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for 
proceedings consistent with such ruling. Alternatively, 
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plaintiff requests that the court remand to the trial court 
for entry of appropriate Findings of Fact on all material 
issues presented by the pleadings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q day of November, 
1986. 
talc Ralph L. Jerman 
B. 'L. Dart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that dn the Q day of November, 1986, -a-w^o^ 
true and correct copy&of Appellant1s Brief ^ 1^" served upon^ 
by delivering -a- cop^to Robert M. Felton, attorney for 
defendants, 5 Triad Center, Suite 585, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84180. 
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Store No. ./g.3-^ 
CONTRACT OF SALE 
1. PARTIES. THIS CONTRACT is between Big Six Corporation 
herein called "Seller", whether one or more, and The Southl and Corpo ra t i on 
herein called "Buyer". 
2. PREMISES. Seller hereby sells and agrees to convey to Buyer and Buyer hereby buys 
and agrees to pay for real estate in the City of S a l t Lake 
Countyof S a l t L a k e and State of Utah , 
as described on Exhibit "A", attached hereto, together with all and singular the improvements 
thereon and the rights and appurtenances pertaining thereto, including any right, title, and 
interest of Seller in and to adjacent streets, alleys, or rights-of-way; such real estate, rights and 
appurtenances being herein called the "property." This contract also covers all fixtures and 
articles of personal property attached to the property and owned by Seller, such as air condi-
tioning and heating equipment, light fixtures, and shrubbery, and all such fixtures and articles 
of personal property are included in the purchase price set forth in Paragraph 4 below. 
3. ESCROW AGENT. The parties agree that Lawyer's Title Insurance Corporation, or its 
designated affiliate, herein called "LTIC", shall act as escrow agent, and shall receive and 
deliver all documents or instruments and receive and disburse all sums of money according to 
the written instructions of the parties and the terms of this contract. The fee or charge of 
LTIC for serving as escrow agent shall be shared equally by the parties. 
4. CONSIDERATION. The purchase price is Twenty Two Thousand . . . , . , . , . . 
• • • • Dollars ($ 22 ,000 .00 ), herein called the "purchase 
price", of which One Thousand , .Dollars ($ 1,009.00 ) has been 
deposited by Buyer as earnest money with LTIC, herein called the "earnest money deposit", 
which earnest money deposit and the balance of the purchase price shall be paid to Seller at 
the closing. 
5. TITLE, (a) Seller agrees at Seller's own expense to furnish Buyer within thirty (30) days 
from the date hereof a preliminary title report or binder issued by LTIC, herein called the "pre-
liminary title report or binder," giving the current condition of title to the property, together 
with copies of ail instruments necessary to explain fully the extent, scope, and effect of any 
matters which are listed as exceptions in the preliminary title report or binder, whereby LTIC 
binds itself to issue to Buyer or its nominee for the full amount of the purchase price an A.L.T.A. 
Policy — Standard Form B 1970, or a comparable form with extended coverage if such form 
is not approved in the state in which the property is located, herein called the "title policy". 
(b) From the date of receipt by Buyer of the preliminary title report or binder and the 
survey provided for in Paragraph 7 hereof, whichever occurs later. Buyer shall have not more 
than thirty (30) days within which to examine the same. If in the opinion of Buyer's attorneys 
the preliminary title report or binder shows good and merchantable titie in fee simple in Seller 
such as LTIC will insure as provided herein, this transaction shall be closed, herein called the 
"closing", within twenty (20) days thereafter, or within twenty (20) days after all of the 
conditions of Paragraph 11 hereof have been fulfilled as provided therein or waived by Buyer, 
whichever occurs later, by the execution and delivery by Seller or the record owner of title to 
the property of a good and sufficient general warranty deed to Buyer conveying the property 
free and clear of any and all encumbrances or securities except those which are acceptable to 
Buyer, the payment by Seller of the premium for the title policy and the payment by Buyer to 
Seller of the purchase price. 
(c) If in the opinion of Buyer's attorneys, the preliminary title report or binder does 
not show good and merchantable title in Seller such as LTIC will insure as provided in Para-
graph 5(b) above, Buyer shall notify Seller of any objections to Seller's title within the thirty 
(30) day period provided for examination of the preliminary title report or binder and survey, 
and Seller agrees to make all reasonable efforts to cure such objections within thirty (30) days 
after receipt of such notice. If within such thirty (30) day period Seller delivers to Buyer curative 
matter or information, Buyer shall have twenty (20) days after the end of such thirty (30) day 
period for examination thereof. If within such twenty (20) day period title is approved by 
Buyer's attorneys, this transaction shall thereafter be closed within the time and as provided 
in Paragraph 5(b) above. If the title has not been approved by Buyer at the end of such thirty 
(30) day period (or such twenty (20) day period, if applicable), Buyer shall have a period of 
fifteen (15) days thereafter within which to waive or attempt itself to cure its objections to title, 
if it desires to do either. If such objections to Seller's title are not cured by Seller or Buyer or 
waived by Buyer within the time provided, Buyer may terminate this contract and the earnest 
money deposit shall be returned to Buyer. If within the times provided, title has been approved 
by Buyer, or Buyer's objections have been cured by Seller or Buyer or waived by Buyer, this 
transaction shall thereafter be closed within the time and as provided in Paragraph 5(b) above. 
6. SELLER'S USE COVENANT. It is understood that the property is being acquired by 
Buyer for the purpose of erecting and operating thereon a convenience grocery and dairy products 
store, with the location of the store building, signs, and curb breaks to be as shown on the sketch 
which is Exhibit "B", attached hereto, or as changed or modified by Buyer and that in the event 
it should develop that such use of the property would violate any ordinances or that Buyer 
1 
\i 
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1 would be prevented from so using and enjoying the property by any regulation or restriction 
2 affecting the property, or by failure or refusal of any authority having jurisdiction over the 
3 property to issue any permit or license, then such fact or facts shall be treated as objections to 
4 Sellers title, the provisions herein with reference thereto shall apply, and Buyer shall not be 
5 required to accept title or to pay for the property. 
6 7. SURVEY. At Seller's expense, Seller agrees to furnish Buyer, along with the preliminary 
7 title report or binder, a topographic survey, herein tailed the "survey", acceptable to LTIC 
8 for extended coverage title insurance, and a report by a competent surveyor locating and 
9 describing the property, showing all corners of the property properly and securely marked by 
10 pins, and certifying as to encroachments. When, in the judgment of Buyer's attorneys, it an-
i l pears from conditions on the ground, or from information contained in the preliminary title 
12 report or binder or other data submitted to such attorneys, that any corner or boundary line 
13 of the property is not definitely located on the ground, or that there may be a conflict with 
14 adjoining tracts, or that changes in the location of corners or lines have resulted from the 
15 widening of any streets or roads, or that other conditions of uncertainty exist as to the size, loca-
16 tion, or boundaries of the property, or that additional information is required to obtain a lot split, 
17 Seller shall cause to be done at Seller's expense such additional survey work as may be necessary 
18 to meet such objections, and shall furnish Buyer reports by the surveyor of such additional work. 
19 8. 1USK OF LOSS. The risk of condemnation and the risk of loss, damage, or destruction 
20 of the property or the improvements thereon by fire or otherwise shall be on Seller until the 
21 closing. Buyer shall have the option to terminate this contract upon the destruction of, or 
22 material change in the property, or improvements thereon, by any cause whatsoever. 
23 9. CONDITION OF PREMISES. Possession of the property in the same condition and state 
24 of repair as on the date of execution hereof, subject only to normal wear, tear, and use since 
25 said date, shall be delivered to Buyer at the closing, free of all leases, tenancies, and occupancies. 
26 10. TAXES AM) ASSESSMENTS. All real estate taxes pertaining to the property shall be 
27 prorated between Buyer and Seller as of the closing. If at the closing Seller has paid the then 
28 current year's taxes, copies of the receipt(s) shall be furnished to Buyer and said receipt(s) shall 
29 be the basis for proration. If Seller has received but has not paid statement(s) for the then current 
30 year's taxes, then said statement(s) shall be basis for proration. If at the closing the taxes for the 
31 current year have not been paid and no statement(s) has (have) been received by Seller but 
32 notice* s) of valuation has (have) been received by Seller, then said notice(s) of valuation times 
33 the previous year's lax rate shall be the basis for proration, and it shall be the obligation of Buyer 
34 to make payment of said current year's taxes. If none of these situations exht at the time of clos-
35 ing, the basis for proration shall be 110% of the previous year's taxes, and Seller agrees to furnish 
36 Buyer copies of the receipt(s) for said previous year's taxes and to pay the then current year's 
37 taxes. 
38 All rents attributable to the property shall also be prorated. 
39 If at the closing, the property or any part thereof shall be or shall have been affected by 
40 an assessment or assessments which are or may become payable in annual installments, of 
41 which the first installment is then a charge or lien on the property or has been paid, then for the 
42 purposes of this contract all of the unpaid installments of any such assessment, including those 
43 which are to become due and payable after the closing, shall be deemed to be due and payable 
44 and to be liens upon the property and shall be paid and discharged by Seller. 
45 11. CONDITIONS. Buyer shall not be required to accept title or pay for the property unless 
46 the following conditions shall have been fulfilled (or waived by Buyer as provided herein) prior 
47 to the closing: 
48 (a) The property being so zoned as to permit the construction and operation of a con-
49 venience grocery and dairy products store, said zoning to be applied for and obtained by 
50 and at the expense of Seller. 
51 (b) Adequate public sewer, water, gas, and electricity lines being located on the prop-
52 erty or in the street or alley immediately adjoining the property and being available for use 
53 on the property at the expense of Seller and without additional cost to Buyer other than 
54 normal connection charges. 
55 (c) There being no covenant or restriction affecting the property or any restriction 
56 under any State, County, City, or local laws, including ordinances, which would prohibit the 
57 sale on the property of alcoholic beverages for consumption off the premises or of gasoline 
58 or petroleum products. 
59 <d) There being no easement or restriction on the property which would adversely 
60 affee* the construction or operation thereon of a grocery store to be 'ocated as shown en 
61 Exhibit "IV. 
62 (e) A sign 'permit having been issued by the appropriate authorities for the installation 
63 of building and polo signs of the type customarily installed by Buyer, said permit to be 
64 applied !or and obtained'by and at the expense of Buyer. 
65 (O The approval of the appropriate authorities of the location of the building, drive-
66 WAV, nnd curb, break . w -hown on Kxhibit- "TV, having been obtained, and n building permit 
67 having been issued u.r the •on^trucUon of the improvements, said approval and permit to be 
68 applied for and obtained ••>>• and at the expense of Buyer. 
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(g) The survey reflecting conditions which will permit Buyer to construct the im-
provement? contemplated by Buyer in a manner and at a cost acceptable to Buyer. 
(h) Test borings showing underground conditions satisfactory to Buyer being obtained 
by and at the expense of Buyer. 
In the event all of the above conditions have not been fulfilled as provided herein or waived 
by Buyer within sixty (60; days from the date of this contract, this contract may be terminated 
and cancelled at the option of Buyer by notice to LTIC and Seller, whereupon the earnest money 
deposit shall be returned to Buyer. 
12. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. If Buyer defaults in its obligations hereunder, the earnest 
money deposit shall be retained by Seller as liquidated damages in lieu of any other remedy 
available to Seller and Buyer shall be and is hereby released from all liability or obligation 
hereunder. 
13. BROKERAGE CHARGES. Seller agrees to pay all brokerage charges, if any, in connec-
tion with this transaction and to indemnify and save Buyer harmless against any and all claims 
for such charges. 
14. NOTICES. Any notice hereunder by either party to the other party shall be in writing 
and shall be deemed to have been properly given when sent by United States Certified Mail, 
Return Receipt Requested, postage fully prepaid, to the address of such other party as follows: 
SELLER: 
B1g Six Corporation 
Archie 0. Coats, Vice President 
3735 Wast 3500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34120 
BUYER: 
The Southland Corporation 
2828 Worth Haskell Avenue 
Dallas, Texas 75204 
15. IRREVOCABLE OFFER. In consideration of One ($1.00) Dollar in hand paid by Buyer 
to Seller, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by Seller, Seller specifically agrees that this 
oiler to sell is hereby made irrevocable for a period of 90 days from the date executed by Seller. 
16. OTHER PROVISIONS. Seller agrees to execute a document in recordable form whicl 
r e s t r i c t s i t s adjacent property as follows: 
Seller agrees that no occupant of any building in the shopping center develop-
ment at this location other than btjyer shall be allowed to sell packaged fluid 
railk, packaged bread products, or delicatessen type food products for consul 
tlon off the premises, except a grocery store occupyina a building containing 
more than 10,000 square feet of floor space* 
17. GENERAL. Time is of the essence to this contract, and this contract constitutes the en-
tire agreement between the parties and may not be changed except by written agreement of the 
parties. 
Seller agrees to fully cooperate with Buyer in obtaining all necessary permits, lot splits, 
zoning changes or other matters which are necessary to enable Buyer to use the property for the 
purposes contemplated. This agreement by Seller shall survive the closing of this contract. 
The provisions hereof shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto 
and their respective heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns. 
Executed by Seller this day of f\ H-'/<~ L 19 7 ^ . 
/ 
SELLER 
Executed by Buyer this ^ day of \<r}<s-£s , 19 7 5 ^ 
(Seal) 
A T T E S ^ "/ 
~<—-y T"^—^ 
Assistant Secretary 
ATTACHMENTS: 
£ EXHIBIT "A" 
BUYER 
By ' ' 
2 EXHIBIT " B " 
/ 
Vice President 
u (Sea ! )— 
• EXHIBIT "C" 
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PROPOSED 7-ELEVEN FOOD STORE. 
TO SUILT AT 
CCTiMER OF STREET AND 
FOR TH£ SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, 
£3-23 KOXTYi HASKELL AVENUE, 
DALLAS. TEXAS, T 5 2 0 4 
STREET/ 
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TO ^ET GRADES BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH CONSTRUCTIOM. GRADES 
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AMENDMENT NO. 1 
STORE NO. 2352-18345 
% iXHIEITA 
Jo 
-Chi &L 
On the 3rd day of July, 1975, Big Six Corporation as SELLER, 
and The Southland Corporation as BUYER, entered into a purchase 
agreement covering the premises commonly known as 3600 West and 
/6200 South, Big Six Corporation Property and more fu l l y described 
/ / Exhibit Exhibit 
_ / ^ in -Schedule A, which Schedule is attached hereto and made a part 
\ j hereof. 
SELLER and BUYER presently desire to amend said purchase 
agreement. 
Now therefore, in consideration of the premises and $10 in hand 
paid each to the other, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, said 
purchase agreement shall be and is hereby amended as follows: 
/ * • ) 
1. Legal Description is amended and attached hereto as 
CTtntfvJU I Q* H . 
E x h i b i t 
2. Lot size is amended to ]j5£ X 102 feet. Amended plot 
plan is attached hereto as Schedule B. / 
E x h i b i t ^i^---' 
In a l l other respects said purchase agreement is hereby ra t i f ied 
and reaffirmed. Executed this £/7^-~ day of /ftuc/^ 1 9 ^ . 
ATTEST: y / / BUYER 
THE SOUJ 
Assistant Secretary 
Byx 
Vice President 
SELLER 
BIG SIX CORPORATION 
By. **Mcv r^ 
-^u-
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EXHIBIT "A" 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION • ^ ^ / ^ 
Beginning at a point which is S°00'55" East 33 feet frcm the 
North Quarter Corner of Section 20, Township 2 South Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and running thence South 0°00'55" 
East 150 f ee t ; thence North 39°56'56" West 110 fee t ; thence North 
0°00'55" West.150 fee t ; thence South 39°56'56M East 110 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
Actual legal to be determined at time of survey. 
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s ENGINEERS & LAND SURVEYORS 
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SURVEYORS CifRTiriCATE: 
s 
I, Paul H. Gin i , do hereby cert i fy that ! a m a Registered Land Surveyor and that 1 ho ld cert i f icate 
No. 3149, as prescribed under the Laws of tha State of Utah. I fur ther cert i fy that by tno au thor i ty of 
ihe owner. j have made u survey a n d plot p lan r?f the proper ty described hereon. 
i tvrthzr cert i fy that this p la t correctly shows the true dimensions of the property surveyed and of 
the improvements located thereon a n d that there are no encroachments or v io iat ions or the zoning 
ordinances except as shown. ^
 Aj J f* <•&'Ji"^ B^O^ 
DESCRIPTION: •• • . • • * | i •• •:.- " ; • . ' . ' • * J{ ^ 0 ! r 
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SURVEYORS CERTIFICATE: 
I, Paul H. Gini, do hereby certify that I am a Registered l and Surveyor and that I hold certificate 
No. 2149, as prescribed under the Laws of the Stale of Utoh. 1 further certify that by the authority of 
the owner, I have made a survey and plot plan of the property described hereon. 
1 further certify that this plat correctly shows the true dimensions of the property surveyed and of 
rht. u . ' r r2vemenu located thereon and that there are no encroachment* or violations of the zoning 
0f£«r..3fices except Q$ shown. 
DESCRIPTION: t&GifjrJ'VJGr A T A PCikjJ* v/v-iiCM .'S S o ^ o O ' ^ f c - ^ O t T , 
i * j : ty :5i ,%Mw-tt4.oFT : PEOM TU& t^oxT^ QUAZ^ZJQL. cbe. SE:C 
C O . 7 2 - 3 - i c l - t -W, S - L . & . *tV\. TWEJOCEr, 
s c : r c o " fc - l O i o pr. THtucfc, 
i'-'vv - IGO.O FT- " i 
I c'"*\' ( ^> *o U l-c. V f: r • u •. K j - . 
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CITY OF WEST JORDAN 
1850 WEST 7800 SOUTH 
Phone 561-1464 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 
84034 
April 11, 1976 
7-11 Stores 
427 Lawndale Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
RE-:. 7-11 on, 6200 South and Dixie Drive 
Gentlemen: 
If the 7-11 store is faced West, we will allow 
an access right-of-way in from 6200 South. We will 
also want two right-of-ways in from Dixie Drive. 
- ,. All property in front of the 7-11 store must be 
black topped. All property must be landscaped. 
The right-of-way on 6200 South will remain there 
until the West Valley Expressway is completed past 
the store. If the traffic is too heavy, the city 
will request the access on 6200 South be closed and 
the curb and gutter replaced or put in by 7-11 at 
their expense. 
Representative of 7-11 
.SWW AND SUBSCRIBED REEQRE ME ON THIS DAT 
My commission expires^ )/y :c;.T.;n?uon c=?>f Dec. 13, iili 
<L±* 
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Robert Felton, 1056 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
SOUTHLAND CORPORATON, a Texas 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAIL C. POTTER, et al. 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C86-0195 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
* * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, Judge of this Court, on April 11, 1986. The Plaintiff 
was represented by B.L. Dart and Ralph Jerman and the Defendant 
was present with his counsel, Robert Felton. 
The Court, having reviewed testimony at trial, the exhibits 
admitted, and having heard the statements of counsel and for good 
cause now enters its Findings of Fact as Follows: 
1. On or about June 4, 1984, Defendants, Gail Potter and 
Lori Potter, bought the property described herein from Big Six 
Corporation. The property purchased by the Defendants is located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and more particularly 
described as: 
"Beginning at a point which is South 00° 00' 
55" East 33.0 feet from the North quarter 
corner of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 00° 00f 50" East 839.89 
feet; thence South 89° 59' 05" West 331.10 
feet; thence North 00° 01f 50" West 840.28 
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feet, to the South line of 6200 South Street, 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 87.31 feet; 
thence South 0° 01f 30" East 129.0 feet; 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 160.0 feet, 
thence North 0° 01f 30" West 129.0 feet, 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 84.0 feet to the 
point of beginning". 
2. In or about April, 1975, Plaintiff, Southland 
Corporation, entered into an agreement to purchase a site for a 
7-Eleven store. The property lies contiguous to that purchased 
by the Defendants in 1984. 
3. On or about March 9, 1976, the agreement between 
Southland Corporation and Big Six Corporation to purchase the 
site for their store was amended to reduce the lot size to 160 
102 feet. 
4. Plaintiff's claim of an easement across property 
purchased by the Defendant is without basis in that the Plaintl 
acquired no property rights to cross this property, there is no 
recorded document conveying any easement or property rights to 
the Plaintiff to use or cross the Defendants1 property and the 
parties have admitted that there was no written conveyance or 
recordable instrument conveying any property right to the 
contiguous property purchased by the Defendants. Further, no 
consideration was exchanged for any property interest in the 
property owned by the Defendants. 
5. Defendants' claim for damages for trespass is not 
supported by the evidence. The Counterclaim for damages should 
be dismissed. 
NOW WHEREFORE, the Court having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact enters these conclusions of law as follows: 
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1. On or about June 4, 1984, Defendants Gail Potter and 
Lori Potter obtained title to the following real property in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, by Warranty Deed from the predecessor 
in interest, Big Six Corporation. The property is described as: 
"Beginning at a point which is South 00° 00f 
55" East 33.0 feet from the North quarter 
corner of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 00° 00f 50" East 839.89 
feet, thence South 89° 59' 05" West 331.10 
feet, thence North 00° 01f 50" West 840.28 
feet, to the South line of 6200 South Street; 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 87.31 feet, 
thence South 0° 01' 30" East 129.0 feet; 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 160.0 feet, 
thence North 0° 01f 30" West 129.0 feet; 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 84.0 feet to the 
point of beginning". 
2. Defendants are the owners of the real property described 
herein free and clear from any property interest on behalf of the 
Plaintiff and title to the property should be quieted to the 
Defendants free and clear of any right or interest of the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff maintains no easement or other property 
right adverse to the Defendants in the foregoing property. 
3. Plaintiff's claim of an easement across the property 
owned by the Defendants is without basis in that the Plaintiff 
acquired no property rights to cross this property; there is no 
recorded document conveying an easement or property rights to the 
Plaintiff to use or cross this realty; the parties have admitted 
there was no written conveyance or recordable instrument 
conveying any property right in the foregoing realty, there was 
no consideration or other enforceable right created and 
Defendants1 rights in the property are superior to those of the 
Plaintiff. 
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4. Defendants' Counterclaim for damages for trespass are 
not supported by the evidence and should be dismissed no cause of 
act ion. . ,-;.. .-*-•• 
5. Defendants are entitled to their costs. 
DATED this ^L^ day of June, 1986. 
By the Court 
ZV— 
James S. Sawaya, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by United 
States first-class mail, postage prepaid, to B.L. Dart and Ralph 
L. Jerman, 1407 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 on 
the day of June, 1986. 
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Robert Felton, 1056 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone; (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
SOUTHLAND CORPORATON, a Texas 
corporat ion, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
GAIL C. POTTER, et al. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-0195 
Judge James S* Sawaya 
* * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, Judge of this Court, on April 11, 1986. Plaintiff, 
Southland corporation, was represented by B.L. Dart and Ralph L. 
Jerman. Defendants were represented by their counsel, Robert 
Felton. This mater was tried ad argued befoe the Court and 
thereafter taken under advisement. 
The Court now being fully informed in the premises and 
heretofore reveiwed the pleadings and evidence submitted at trial 
having heard the arguments of counsel and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters 
its judgments as follows: 
1. Title to the following property located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, is hereby quieted in the Defendantsf, Gail 
C. Potter and Lori S. Potter, free and clear of any claims, 
property rights or easements on behalf of the Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed no caus« of action. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The real property which is quieted to the Defendants is 
located in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described as; 
"Beginning at a point which is South 00° 00' 
55" East 33.0 feet from the North quarter 
corner of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 00° 00f 50" East 839.89 
feet; thence South 89° 591 05" West 331.10 
feet, thence North 00° 011 50" West 840.28 
feet, to the South line of 6200 South Street; 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 87.31 feet; 
thence South 0° 01f 30" East 129.0 feet; 
thence South 89° 56f 56" East 160.0 feet, 
thence North 0° 01f 30" West 129.0 feet; 
thence South 89° 56' 56" East 84.0 feet to the 
point of beginning". 
2. Defendants1 Counterclaim for damages is hereby 
dismissed, no cause of action. 
3. Costs are awarded to Defendants. 
DATED this ^ \ day of June, 1986. 
By the Court: 
James S. Sawaya, Judge 
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